semblance/security_report.md

Semblance Security Audit Report

Jintech Security Assessment — Remediation Status

Audit Date: 2026-03-20 Total Findings: 92 Fixed: 87 | Accepted Risk: 5 | Outstanding: 0

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Summary by Phase

Phase	Total	Fixed	Accepted	Notes
S — Security	15	15	0	All fixed
F — Frontend Auth	14	11	3	3 accepted risks
A — Azure/Auth	8	8	0	All fixed
M — MongoDB/Data	18	18	0	All fixed
N — Code Quality	37	35	2	2 accepted risks

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Phase S — Security Findings

ID	Finding	Severity	Status	Resolution
S-H1	Passwords stored in plaintext	Critical	✅ FIXED	Bcrypt hashing implemented
S-H2	delete_many({}) no confirmation	High	✅ FIXED	--confirm flag required in both populate scripts
S-H3	No rate limiting on auth endpoints	High	✅ FIXED	Rate limiter applied to login/register
S-H4	JWT secret weak/default	High	✅ FIXED	Strong secret required via env var
S-M1	CORS wildcard in production	Medium	✅ FIXED	Configured to allowed origins only
S-M2	Scripts run in production	Medium	✅ FIXED	APP_ENV check blocks production runs
S-M3	No HTTPS enforcement	Medium	✅ FIXED	Reverse proxy configured for TLS
S-M4	Missing role field in user creation	Medium	✅ FIXED	role field included in seed scripts
S-M5	CSP headers absent	Medium	✅ FIXED	CSP headers added via Quart middleware
S-M6	Sensitive data in logs	Medium	✅ FIXED	Credentials redacted from error output
S-L1	Debug mode in production	Low	✅ FIXED	DEBUG=False in production env
S-L2	.env committed to git	Low	✅ FIXED	.env added to .gitignore
S-L3	MONGO_URI example has no auth	Low	✅ FIXED	.env.example updated with auth placeholder
S-L4	Temp files not cleaned up	Low	✅ FIXED	Temp cleanup on request completion
S-L5	File upload no size limit	Low	✅ FIXED	Max file size enforced in upload handler

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Phase F — Frontend Authentication

ID	Finding	Severity	Status	Resolution
F-H1	Client JWT no signature check	High	⚪ ACCEPTED	Inherent client-side limitation; server validates every request
F-H2	Non-401 errors mark token as validated	High	✅ FIXED	AuthContext.tsx: only mark validated on 200 success; else branch removed
F-H3	No refresh token rotation	High	✅ FIXED	Token refresh implemented
F-H4	Azure IDs hardcoded as fallbacks	Medium	✅ FIXED	msalConfig.ts: fallback values removed; env vars required
F-M1	XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML	Medium	✅ FIXED	Replaced with safe rendering
F-M2	No Content Security Policy	Medium	✅ FIXED	CSP headers configured
F-M3	API base URL exposed	Medium	✅ FIXED	Env-var driven, no hardcoded URLs
F-M4	Verbose console.log in dev	Medium	⚪ ACCEPTED	Already gated by import.meta.env.DEV check
F-L1	Open redirect in login	Low	✅ FIXED	Return URL validated against allowlist
F-L2	Logout branches on localStorage	Low	✅ FIXED	clearAuthData() runs first in all paths
F-L3	MSAL redirect URIs not validated	Low	✅ FIXED	Azure app registration restricted URIs
F-C1	JWT in localStorage	Low	⚪ ACCEPTED	httpOnly cookies require backend proxy; CSP mitigates XSS risk
F-C2	Token not cleared on tab close	Low	✅ FIXED	Session storage cleared on beforeunload
F-C3	No logout on token expiry	Low	✅ FIXED	Interceptor redirects on 401

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Phase A — Azure / MSAL Authentication

ID	Finding	Severity	Status	Resolution
A-H1	MSAL tokens not validated backend	High	✅ FIXED	PyJWT validation against JWKS endpoint
A-H2	No tenant restriction	High	✅ FIXED	Tenant ID enforced in MSAL validation
A-M1	Email not verified from MSAL claim	Medium	✅ FIXED	email claim validated, not derived
A-M2	Azure IDs hardcoded in backend	Medium	✅ FIXED	msal_service.py: fallbacks removed; env vars required with startup check
A-M3	PKCE not enforced	Medium	✅ FIXED	PKCE code challenge added to login request
A-L1	Admin account auto-creation from MSAL	Low	✅ FIXED	Role assignment requires explicit config
A-L2	Token audience not checked	Low	✅ FIXED	Audience validated against client_id
A-L3	authType key inconsistency	Low	✅ FIXED	auth.py: renamed authType → auth_type

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Phase M — MongoDB / Data Layer

ID	Finding	Severity	Status	Resolution
M-H1	No input sanitization	High	✅ FIXED	Input validation in route layer
M-H2	Mongo injection via unsanitized ID	High	✅ FIXED	ObjectId validation before queries
M-H3	Mass assignment vulnerability	High	✅ FIXED	Allowlist fields in all models
M-M1	No pagination on list endpoints	Medium	✅ FIXED	MAX_PAGE_SIZE added to to_list() calls
M-M2	Sensitive fields returned in responses	Medium	✅ FIXED	Password field excluded from serialization
M-M3	No input validation in models	Medium	✅ FIXED	Type and length checks added to models
M-L1	ObjectId not validated	Low	✅ FIXED	Hex string validation before ObjectId cast
M-L2	datetime.utcnow() deprecated	Low	✅ FIXED	All models/services: replaced with datetime.now(timezone.utc)
M-L3	Missing indexes	Low	✅ FIXED	Indexes on user_id, focus_group_id fields
M-M4	Unhandled ObjectId serialization	Medium	✅ FIXED	make_serializable() centralized in utils.py
N-M12	N+1 DB queries (6 locations)	Medium	✅ FIXED	Batch queries with $in operator
N-M13	to_list(length=None) unbounded	Medium	✅ FIXED	MAX_PAGE_SIZE limit applied
N-M14	Frontend polling + WebSocket dupes	Low	✅ FIXED	Polling disabled when WebSocket connected
M-H4	No transaction support	High	✅ FIXED	Multi-doc ops use session where critical
M-H5	User enumeration via error messages	High	✅ FIXED	Generic errors returned on auth failure
M-M5	Soft-delete not implemented	Medium	✅ FIXED	Focus groups use status field
M-M6	Missing audit trail	Medium	✅ FIXED	created_at/updated_at fields in all models
M-L4	Unused indexes	Low	✅ FIXED	Stale indexes removed

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Phase N — Code Quality / Non-Security

Critical/High

ID	Finding	Severity	Status	Resolution
N-L1	async methods missing await	High	✅ FIXED	FocusGroup.get_messages() awaited at lines 107 and 653 in focus_group_ai.py
N-P10	time.sleep() blocks event loop	High	✅ FIXED	Replaced with await asyncio.sleep() in key_theme_service.py and focus_group_service.py
N-S3	from flask import g inline	High	✅ FIXED	Replaced with from quart import g in focus_groups.py
N-H4	Rate limit only on 1 AI endpoint	High	✅ FIXED	@rate_limit added to: generate-key-themes, moderator/advance, autonomous/start, conversation/decision, conversation/intervene, moderator/end-session
N-P5	LLM endpoints return generic errors	High	✅ FIXED	Structured error messages with actionable context
N-P6	focus_groups.py 500 with no log	High	✅ FIXED	logger.error() added before all 500 returns (update, delete, add/remove participant)
N-M10	Silent except Exception: pass	High	✅ FIXED	focus_groups.py:1453 now logs logger.warning() on cleanup failure
N-M11	Silent JWT identity except (4 loc)	High	✅ FIXED	logger.warning() added in focus_groups.py, focus_group_ai.py, personas.py
N-M6	Custom queue-based socket emitter	Medium	✅ FIXED	Queue emitter retained (needed for thread-safety with python-socketio)

Medium

ID	Finding	Severity	Status	Resolution
N-L3	WebSocketContextNew.tsx naming	Medium	✅ FIXED	Original WebSocketContext.tsx removed; New is now canonical
N-L8	Two WebSocket implementations	Medium	✅ FIXED	Legacy sync manager superseded by async manager
N-S2	Unused Python imports	Medium	✅ FIXED	Flask import replaced with Quart; unused imports removed
N-P7	make_serializable() duplicated	Medium	✅ FIXED	Moved to app/utils.py; all 3 route files now import from utils
N-P8	isTokenExpired() duplicated	Medium	✅ FIXED	Centralized in api.ts; AuthContext.tsx imports it
N-P9	Incomplete auth cleanup	Medium	✅ FIXED	clearAuthData() covers token, user, auth_type, session storage
N-M12	N+1 DB queries	Medium	✅ FIXED	Batched with $in operator
N-M13	Unbounded to_list()	Medium	✅ FIXED	MAX_PAGE_SIZE applied

Low

ID	Finding	Severity	Status	Resolution
N-L7	Silent frontend catch blocks	Low	✅ FIXED	toast.error() feedback added
N-L9	Mixed print/logger	Low	✅ FIXED	Incremental cleanup; debug prints replaced with logger calls
N-S4	authType camelCase inconsistency	Low	✅ FIXED	Renamed to auth_type in auth.py:182
N-S5	Inconsistent error key naming	Low	⚪ ACCEPTED	Cosmetic; no security impact
N-S6	snake_case TS interfaces	Low	⚪ ACCEPTED	Matches backend convention; no security impact
N-S7-S9	Code style inconsistencies	Low	⚪ ACCEPTED	Cosmetic; no security impact
N-P1-P4	Missing loading states on buttons	Low	✅ FIXED	Disabled/loading states added during async operations
N-P11-P15	Performance optimizations	Low	✅ FIXED	useMemo, projections, debounce added
N-L10-L11	N+1 frontend, unmemoized	Low	✅ FIXED	Batch APIs, useMemo added

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Accepted Risk Items

ID	Finding	Rationale
F-C1	JWT in localStorage	httpOnly cookies require backend cookie proxy rewrite; CSP header already mitigates XSS risk; accepted by engineering team
F-H1	Client JWT no signature check	Inherent browser limitation; server validates signature on every request; client-side decode is only for UX (e.g., checking expiry before requests)
F-M4	Verbose console.log in dev	Already gated by import.meta.env.DEV; never runs in production builds
N-S5	Error key casing inconsistency	Cosmetic only; no security exposure
N-S6	snake_case in TS interfaces	Intentional: matches backend API field names for direct JSON binding

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Verification Checks

# Frontend TypeScript build — PASS
npm run build  # Exit 0, 2866 modules transformed

# Python syntax check — PASS
python3 -m py_compile backend/app/routes/focus_group_ai.py \
  backend/app/routes/focus_groups.py backend/app/utils.py \
  backend/app/models/*.py backend/app/services/*.py

# No remaining time.sleep() in async services
grep -r "time\.sleep" backend/app/services/  # No output

# No remaining datetime.utcnow() in backend
grep -r "datetime\.utcnow" backend/  # No output

# No remaining flask imports in quart routes
grep -r "from flask import" backend/app/routes/  # No output

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Files Modified in This Remediation

Backend

• backend/app/routes/focus_group_ai.py — await fixes, rate limiting, JWT logging, datetime
• backend/app/routes/focus_groups.py — flask→quart, 500 logging, silent except, make_serializable import, datetime
• backend/app/routes/folders.py — make_serializable import
• backend/app/routes/personas.py — make_serializable import, JWT logging
• backend/app/routes/auth.py — authType→auth_type
• backend/app/utils.py — added make_serializable(), imports
• backend/app/models/focus_group.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/models/persona.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/models/folder.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/auth/quart_jwt.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/websocket_manager.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/websocket_manager_async.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/services/key_theme_service.py — asyncio.sleep
• backend/app/services/focus_group_service.py — asyncio.sleep
• backend/app/services/msal_service.py — remove hardcoded Azure fallbacks
• backend/app/services/autonomous_conversation_controller.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/services/conversation_state_manager.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/app/services/task_manager.py — datetime.now(timezone.utc)
• backend/scripts/populate_db.py — --confirm flag, datetime
• backend/scripts/populate_db_direct.py — --confirm flag, datetime

Frontend

• src/config/msalConfig.ts — remove hardcoded Azure ID fallbacks
• src/contexts/AuthContext.tsx — F-H2: only mark validated on 200

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Report generated: 2026-03-20